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THE REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T
M Elizabeth Magilt

I.

INTRODUCTION

A principal legacy of the Rehnquist Court is its revitalization of doctrines associated with federalism. That jurisprudence has many critics and
many defenders. They disagree about how to describe what has happened,
the importance of what has happened, and the wisdom of what has happened. But they all agree that something has happened. There has been
genuine innovation in this area of constitutional law.
Not so with separation of powers doctrine. Commentators do not perceive important shifts in the doctrine. Nor should they-the reasoning and
results in the Rehnquist Court cases are of a piece with what came before.
Lack of "revolution" (using the term loosely) was not for lack of opportunity. The Supreme Court had many opportunities to revise its doctrines.
And, from the perspective that the Court has invoked in explaining many of
its federalism cases, there is much-very much, in fact-that is not right
about the structure of the federal government and the constitutional rules
that permit that structure.
This paper asks why there has been no "revolution" in separation of
powers jurisprudence during the Rehnquist Court. Many would expect doctrinal developments in federalism and separation of powers to track one another. Investigating why they have not done so reveals, in fact, that the
internal and external factors that influence the developments in the two areas are quite different.

Professor of Law, John V. Ray Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks
to Lillian BeVier, Eric Claeys, John Harrison, John Jeffries, Mike Klarman, Daryl Levinson, Dick
Merrill, Jennifer Mnookin, Jim Ryan, John Setear, Larry Walker, and participants in the summer faculty
workshop series at University of Virginia School of Law School for helpful comments and conversation.
Emil Barth, Jeremy Byrum and Anne Ralph provided excellent research assistance. The title of this article echoes the book on the Burger Court edited by Vince Blasi, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (1983). This paper was prepared for an April 2004 conference on the
Rehnquist Court held at Northwestern University School of Law. I thank the participants in that conference for their comments, and I am especially grateful to Professor Steve Calabresi for his thoughtful and
useful commentary on my paper.
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II.

READING THE REHNQUIST COURT

A.

A FederalismRevolution
The Rehnquist Court has worked important changes in the doctrines re-

lating to federalism. For the first time since the post-New Deal period, the
Court has invalidated some acts of Congress as beyond the scope of the
commerce power, making clear in the process that there are some judicially
enforceable outer limits on the scope of that power.' It has also invalidated
some acts of Congress on Tenth2 and Eleventh Amendment grounds. And

it has held invalid some exercises of Congress's power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.4 While their long-range effects are not entirely
clear, taken together the Court's rulings plainly restrict the scope of federal
power.
B. Separationof Powers

The Rehnquist Court had a steady stream of separation of powers
cases, 5 and it becomes a flood if one includes Article III standing cases.6
Several of the cases were high-profile and politically salient. The Court

validated the Independent Counsel Act7 and the creation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission;' it invalidated the line-item veto9 and rebuffed Presi-

dent Clinton's executive-power based claim that he was entitled to a stay in
I United

States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).

2 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).

But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act of 1994).
3 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
4 City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Morrison, 529 U.S. at
598.
5 From the beginning of the Rehnquist Court to today, other than Article Ill standing
cases, my
count includes the following: Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361 (1989), Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989), Touby v. United States,
500 U.S. 160 (1991), Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement ofAircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991), Freytag v. Commissioner,501 U.S. 868 (1991), Weiss v. United
States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994), Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), Loving v. United
States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.
681 (1997), Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000),
and Whitman v. American TruckingAss'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
6 The most important include: Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,497 U.S. 871 (1990), Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998); Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), and Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
7 Olson, 487 U.S. 654.
8 Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361.
9 City of New York, 524 U.S. 417.
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a civil suit arising out of actions he took before he was President." There
were low-profile cases as well, some of them consequential. The Court invalidated a statute extending the statute of limitations for securities fraud12
cases;" it rejected a challenge to a statute on Origination Clause grounds;
it sustained delegations of authority from Congress to the executive 3 and
the judiciary; 4 and it evaluated several Appointments Clause cases. 5
In contrast to the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions, these cases
had no notable impact on separation of powers law. This claim is difficult
to prove. For instance, perhaps some years hence the line-item veto case
will be the centerpiece of an invigorated separation of powers jurisprudence. Oddly enough, that invigorated doctrine could go in two different
directions. If the dissenters' views of what was at stake in the case-namely,
that the case was about the permissible scope of delegations to the executive' 6 -the invalidation of the veto could conceivably later be read to restrict the sort of authority Congress can delegate to the executive. Or the
case might be read as a pro-legislative power opinion in the sense that the
functional complaint about the veto was that it diminished legislative power
relative to the President. The President's power was enhanced, so went the
argument, because the line-item veto undermined Congress's ability to get
what it wanted by bundling proposals together and forcing the President to
an all-or-nothing choice on a Congressionally-designed package. 7 On that
reading, the invalidation of the line-item veto could portend other Congressfriendly decisions.
These speculative predictions notwithstanding, most commentators do
not perceive dramatic changes in separation-of-powers jurisprudence. As
for the black-letter doctrine itself, only one case (Morrison v. Olson, dis10

Jones, 520 U.S. 681.
II Plaut,514 U.S. 211; see also Miller, 530 U.S. 327.
12 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
13 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748
(1996); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991); Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212
(1989).
14 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
15 Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252
(1991); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994);
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997). Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), also involved
the Appointments Clause, and Morrison and Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, both involved inter-branch appointments.
16 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 465 (1998) ("It is [the nondelegation] doctrine, and
not the Presentment Clause, that was discussed in the Field opinion, and it is this doctrine, and not the
Presentment Clause, that is the issue presented by the statute before us here.") (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17 The majority in the line-item veto case may have gestured toward this argument when it noted,
"[olur first President understood the text of the Presentment Clause as requiring that he either 'approve
all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto."' Id. at 440. Whether the Court is invoking this argument, it is
a conventional one against a legislative veto. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in
Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 627 & n.69 (2001).
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cussed shortly) self-consciously adjusted the existing doctrine in the way
that is evident in some federalism cases. There are not signals of a quiet
revolution. The court decided several delegation cases, applying the "intelligible principle" test and upholding all of the delegations. 8 It evaluated
several appointments arrangements, largely applying the pre-existing
framework.19 Mistretta," the Line-Item Veto Case,"'and Clinton v. Jones2"
all applied already established frameworks. The court can subtly change

the framework by applying it in a new way, but the outcomes in those three
cases are unremarkable. In Mistretta, the Court clearly perceived the question as difficult. But, in light of the legitimacy of independent agencies
(both the work they do under the understanding of the non-delegation doctrine and that their "independence" is constitutional), that result is far from
shocking. The Court invalidated the narrowly drawn line-item veto but, in
18 Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361; Touby, 500 U.S. 160; Loving, 517 U.S. 748; Whitman, 531 U.S. 457.
19 Olson, 487 U.S. 654, which did revise the doctrine, is discussed in the text, infra text accompanying notes 26-44. The other cases evaluating appointments arrangements include: Mistretta, 488 U.S.
361, Metropolitan Washington Airports, 501 U.S. 252, Freytag, 501 U.S. 868, Weiss, 510 U.S. 163, and
Edmond, 520 U.S. 651.
20 488 U.S. at 374 ("In light of our approval of these broad delegations, we harbor no doubt that
Congress' delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to
meet constitutional requirements."); id. at 380 (outlining standard separation of powers test for evaluation of an institutional arrangement); id. at 390 ("In light of this precedent and practice, we can discern
no separation-of-powers impediment to the placement of the Sentencing Commission within the Judicial
Branch."); id. at 397 ("We find Congress' requirement of judicial service somewhat troublesome, but we
do not believe that the Act impermissibly interferes with the functioning of the Judiciary."); id. at 404
("In light of the foregoing history and precedent, we conclude that the principle of separation of powers
does not absolutely prohibit Article III judges from serving on commissions such as that created by the
Act."); id. at 409 ("We have never considered it incompatible with the functioning of the Judicial
Branch that the President has the power to elevate federal judges from one level to another or to tempt
judges away from the bench with Executive Branch positions."); id. at 411 ("[W]e see no risk that the
President's limited removal power will compromise the impartiality of Article III judges serving on the
Commission and, consequently, no risk that the Act's removal provision will prevent the Judicial Branch
from performing its constitutionally assigned function of fairly adjudicating cases and controversies.");
id. at 412 ("We conclude that in creating the Sentencing Commission-an unusual hybrid in structure
and authority--Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset the constitutionally
mandated balance of powers among the coordinate Branches. The Constitution's structural protections
do not prohibit Congress from delegating to an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent with such significant statutory direction as is
present here.").
21 City of New York, 524 U.S. at 438-40 (holding that the line-item veto violates bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Articles I and 11).
22 520 U.S. 681, 692 (1997) ("Petitioner's principal submission-that in 'all but the most exceptional cases,' the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation
arising out of events that occurred before he took office-cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent."
(citation omitted)); id. at 705 ("In sum, '[i]t is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not
bar every exercise ofjurisdiction over the President of the United States.' If the Judiciary may severely
burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, and if it may
direct appropriate process to the President himself, it must follow that the federal courts have power to
determine the legality of his unofficial conduct." (citation omitted)).
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doing so, the Court applied the standard tools of analysis. Justice Stevens'
opinion for the Court, in fact, reads much like Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Chadha. According to these two majorities, the legislative and the
line-item veto ran afoul of the bicameralism and presentment requirements
of the Constitution.3 Whether either "veto" violated the relevant Constitutional rules was open to question,24 but the similar decision-making method
in the two cases is the point here. Finally, Clinton v. Jones, for all its politiwas a routine application of principles developed in earlier
cal salience,
25
cases.

Morrison is the only case that could not be described as ho-hum. That
case explicitly adjusted the rules about permissible removal arrangements
that were set forth in Myers v. United States26 and Humphrey's Executor v.
United States.27 Myers held that Congress could not require that a postmaster's removal by the President be contingent on the advice and consent of
the Senate. 28 Although a dispute about a postmaster's removal might seem
obscure, the holding was consequential because it meant the judicially imposed demise of the Tenure in Office Act. The Tenure in Office Act, of
course, was an 1867 statute dictating that an officer appointed with Senate
consent held office until the Senate approved the officer's successor. 9
President Johnson was impeached in 1868, but not convicted, for discharging the Secretary of War in violation of the statute." It was not until Myers
in 1926 that the Court decided the constitutionality of such an act. The
Myers Court's vindication of Presidential removal authority, however, was
short lived. The holding was importantly limited just nine years later, in
1935's Humphrey's Executor. There, the Court held that Congress could,
by providing commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission a form of
tenure, limit the President's ability to fire such a Commissioner based on
policy differences. 3' The Court in Humphrey's Executor distinguished
23 City of New York, 524 U.S. at 438 ("In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended
There is no provision in the Constitution that
two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each ....
authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes."); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 95657 (1983) ("Since it is clear that the action by the House under § 244(c)(2) was not within any of the express constitutional exceptions authorizing one House to act alone, and equally clear that it was an exercise of legislative power, that action was subject to the standards prescribed in Art. L").
24 City of New York, 524 U.S. at 464-65 (line-item veto fully satisfies bicameralism and presentment requirements) (Scalia, J., dissenting); E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 125, 134 ("The legislative veto
'alters legal rights,' however, only because the Court chooses to characterize its effect that way.").
25 See supra note 22.
26 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

27 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
28 Myers, 272 U.S. at 176.
29 Tenure in Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867).
30 See generally MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON

(Harold M. Hyman ed., 1973).
31 295 U.S. 602.
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Myers as involving a "purely executive" officer. Until Morrison, then, the
constitutional line between Myers and Humphrey's was the difference between "purely executive" officers (that the President had the power to remove without any interference from Congress) and quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial officers (where Congress could limit the President's removal
authority by providing tenure protection). 2
After Morrison, Congress's ability to limit the President's power of
removal no longer turns on whether the officer is exercising "purely executive" authority.33 After Morrison, the question is whether the tenure protection interferes with the President's ability to perform his executive
functions, including his duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."34 This is an important change in the doctrine, and the result in the
case-the idea that there can be an "independent" prosecutor in the executive branch-makes one sit up and take notice.
But Morrison does not a revolution in separation-of-powers doctrine
make. The doctrinal adjustment was already implicit in the arrangements
sanctioned by Humphrey's Executor. Independent agencies like the Federal
Trade Commission, in addition to their "quasi" legislative and judicial functions, also perform some "purely executive" functions. To the extent that
for-cause limitations could be imposed on officials that performed any executive functions, even if they did not perform solely executive functions,
the Myers line was not fully respected. Morrison admitted what had been
true in practice.
Morrison also respected another part of the pre-existing
Myers/Humphrey's Executor framework. In addition to distinguishing between purely executive and non-purely executive officers, that framework
distinguished between direct (Myers tenure-in-office act type arrangements
where the Senate had to consent to the removal) and indirect (Humphrey's
Executor for-cause tenure protection) congressional involvement with removal. The independent counsel's tenure was protected by the indirect
method and in that sense it is not surprising that the Court viewed it as permissible. Finally, to focus directly on the comparison between two areas of
law that is the question of this paper, to the extent that Morrison does represent important evolution in the doctrine, it is away from, not toward, the
evolution evident in the federalism cases. The federalism cases are often
defended as movement in the direction of a historically sanctioned allocation of authority between the federal and state governments. But Morrison
moves away from, rather than toward, such historical arrangements.
Perhaps this relative stasis in separation of powers law can be easily
explained. One might argue that federalism doctrines, until the Court adjusted them, were inconsistent with a proper understanding of the constitu32 487 U.S. at 688-89.
33 Id. at 689.
34 Id. at 689-90 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3) (alterations in original).
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tion (however one defines "proper") while separation of powers jurisprudence closely tracked such understandings. But this is not satisfying. The
federalism cases are often defended as bringing the law into line with historically-sanctioned understandings of the appropriate constitutional balance between the state and federal governments. A similar case for reform
of the law can be made in the separation of powers area. Consider administrative and independent agencies, perhaps the most obvious arrangements
that are in tension with both textual and historical constitutional commitments. Delegations of authority to these entities outstrip any that early
Congresses, much less Framers of the Constitution, could possibly have
imagined. Those agencies not only issue general rules resolving questions
that one might think should be addressed by statutes (trade-offs between
health benefit and cost, for instance), but they are permitted to adjudicate
individual controversies. The actions these agencies perform are constitutionally permissible under the nondelegation doctrine and the doctrines that
permit Article I courts. Officers that direct independent agencies can also
be insulated from the President in various ways. These present-day institutional arrangements are, at a minimum, in tension with the text and the historical understanding of the provisions of the constitution that touch on
separation of powers. There are other examples as well. Congress's now
routine approval of omnibus bills diminishes the power of the President's
veto.35 The scope and breadth of Presidential lawmaking, through Executive Orders primarily, has grown dramatically over time.36 There is thus no
35 Judith A. Best, Budgetary Breakdown and the Vitiation of the Veto, in THE FETTERED
PRESIDENCY:

LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 119, 121-23 (L. Gordon Crovitz &

Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) (observing that "the last minute omnibus appropriations bill is virtually
veto proof' because the President, not Congress, will take the blame for a government shutdown); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the UnitaryExecutive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 79 (1995)
(arguing that the President's power to exercise his "national, anti-factional voice" in the appropriations
process is reduced when unrelated riders are added to an omnibus appropriations bill because of the political consequences of a government shutdown resulting from a veto of the bill over the riders); Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Bottom Line on the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 235
(1997) (discussing the diminishment of the President's veto power due to omnibus legislation as one of
the reasons for support of line-item veto power in general and the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996); Glen
Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV. 403, 407-09 (1988) (explaining
that bills that bundle public and private goods together, including omnibus bills, are rarely vetoed because the President is unwilling to incur the political costs resulting from failing to approve the public
goods provisions or has judged that the benefits of the bill overall outweigh the costs of the offending
private goods provisions); J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply
to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 467-74 (1990) (asserting that omnibus bills and other
bundled bills diminish the President's veto power). But see Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost
Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1605, 1619-23 (1997) (arguing
that omnibus bills do not weaken the President's veto power because, "[a]n energetic President, through
the threatened use of his veto power, may take advantage of high stakes omnibus legislation to enhance
his bargaining position").
36 KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL

POWER 79-87 (2001) (concluding that executive orders have become more substantive in nature over
time, that the number of significant executive orders issued each year has increased since the 1950s, and
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shortage of examples of institutional arrangements and practices that are
hard to square with the text and the historical understanding of the constitution. The Court's failure to revise separation of powers law, in other words,
cannot be explained as a product of correspondence between a proper understanding of the constitution (as that is understood in the federalism
cases) and the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence.37
In fact, in reviewing the Rehnquist Court's separation of powers cases,
one is struck by just how tame they are. In a period where the Court seems
willing to upset some old assumptions about the allocation of authority between the federal and state governments, the Court shrinks from any interpretation that would work a serious change in either the doctrine or in the
structure of the federal government. The only two outliers are Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia. Justice Thomas, writing for himself, has asked
whether the test that has long served as the touchstone of the non-delegation
doctrine-which asks whether Congress has provided an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of discretion-serves to prevent "cessions of
legislative power."38 "I believe," he wrote, "that there are cases in which
the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision
is simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than 'legislative."' 39 Justice Thomas's doubts are a notable development, but it is
equally notable that he is alone. Justice Scalia has also played the lone
wolf. He dissented by himself in the cases validating the Independent
Counsel Act4 and the U.S. Sentencing Commission.4

He has also ex-

pressed qualified support for notions of a unitary executive, arguments that
have attracted few adherents.42

that "the percentage of executive orders that deal with foreign affairs, executive branch administration,
and domestic policy has grown significantly since the 1930s"); Calabresi, supra note 35, at 30 (noting
the "anti-Presidentialist" argument that the President has "too much power over lawmaking," in part because of a "much more aggressive presidential use of executive orders and signing statements"); Tara L.
Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J.
LEGIS. 1 (2002) (observing that the scope of executive orders has expanded historically, especially in
times of crisis).
37 I should note here that my focus is primarily in the domestic arena. I am not taking
on and evaluating separation of powers questions that arise in the foreign affairs context. There is a large body of
literature examining those contexts. See, e.g., John K. Setear, The President's Rational Choice of a
Treaty's PreratificationPathway: Article II, Congressional-ExecutiveAgreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S5-39 (2002).
38 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
39 Id.
40 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42 The most obvious case here is Justice Scalia's solo dissent in Morrison. But there are others.
See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 815 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that prosecution is an executive function and that is the reason that a federal court
cannot appoint private citizen to investigate and prosecute criminal contempt); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997) (stating that the Brady Act is constitutionally problematic, inter alia, because the President cannot control state officers who administer the law); id. at 959-60 (calling Justice
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Lack of innovation in separation of powers law was also not for lack of
opportunity. The Court had cases that it could have used as opportunities to
revise the law along any of the possible dimensions-the relationship between the legislature and the executive, between the legislature and the
courts, and between the executive and the courts. There were a number of
non-delegation doctrine cases that presented opportunities to re-think that
doctrine43 and several cases evaluating appointment and removal arrangements for officers that could have permitted the Court to re-think its stance
there as well."
III. WHY No REVOLUTION?
One might have thought that developments in separation of powers
doctrine would mimic developments in federalism law. If the evolution
evident in federalism doctrines is a result of evolving methods of interpretation-the rise of more historically45 or textually46 minded constitutional interpretation, for instance-wouldn't that also suggest changes in separation
of powers law? Some have explained federalism developments as part of
the Court's new-found confidence, even arrogance, in its exercise of judicial review, a confidence that makes it more willing to invalidate the acts of
the legislature without angst about the counter-majoritarian nature of its decisions.47 But, if jurisprudential trends are changing or if the Court is newly
bold, such developments should affect other areas of law. In particular,
they should have implications for separation of powers doctrine. Federalism and separation of powers provisions of the constitution are both "structural," that is, they channel authority to government decisionmakers rather
Scalia's Article 11argument "colorful hyperbole") (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 & n.8 (2000) (holding that qui tam relators
can have Art III standing, but reserving the question of whether qui tam relators violate the Appointments Clause or the take care clause of Article 11).
43 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996); Am.
Trucking, 531 U.S. 457.
44 Olson, 487 U.S. 654, is the most important case. There, the Court went beyond the existing
precedent rather than revised it. In FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994), the Court
held that the FEC did not have the authority to litigate on its own behalf in the Supreme Court. It was a
statutory, not constitutional, holding. Id. at 99. The challenges to the FEC presented in the lower court
were based on unitary executive theories. See FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 823-34
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (addressing challenges to the statute's requirement of bi-partisan appointment, to the
FEC's independence of the President in its law enforcement activities, and to the appointment by Congress of ex officio members of the Commission).
45 See generally G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L.
REV. 485 (2002) (documenting the growth and influence of the role of history in legal scholarship generally and constitutional scholarship specifically).
46 See generally Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in ConstitutionalTheory, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985).
47 Larry D. Kramer, Forward, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (2001) ("The Rehnquist
Court no longer views itself as first among equals, but has instead staked its claim to being the only institution empowered to speak with authority when it comes to the meaning of the Constitution.").
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than place substantive limits on the actions of any and all government decisionmaking. Just as some have argued that the balance between federal and
state power should be resolved by politics,4 8 so too have some argued that
the division of authority among the three branches of the national government should be left to politics.49 At least as a starting point, then, federalism and separation of powers doctrines can both be considered apples.
Why don't they ripen and fall off the tree together?
This Part stakes out answers to that question. It identifies both internal
and external influences on separation of powers doctrine, suggesting that,
while there may be important analogies between the two areas of law, it is
the dis-anologies that help explain the distinctive patterns in the Rehnquist
Court.
The first two arguments suggest that the Court is unlikely to forsake
judicial enforcement of many of the separation of powers provisions of the
Constitution. These arguments identify judicial incentives to protect the
exercise of judicial power that are in play in some separation of powers
controversies and factors that make certain separation of powers questions
eminently justiciable. These factors help explain why the Court is likely to
be continuously in the separation of powers business, and by that I mean relying on doctrines that will sometimes result in the invalidation of the actions of other governmental actors. As a result, the Court is unlikely to
announce, as in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority," the
explicit nonjusticiability of certain separation of powers questions or, as in
the combined effect of Wickard v. Filburnt ' and United States v. Darby,52 to
implicitly state that anything goes. Given the factors identified below, in
other words, parts of separation of powers law will be more static across
time than federalism doctrines.
A. JudicialIncentives and the Protection of the Independent Judiciary
The most straightforward reason we are unlikely to see a full retreat
from the enforcement of separation of powers provisions of the Constitution
is the unique interest that the Court has in this field. To put the point simply: When the Court perceives a threat to the exercise of federal judicial
power, it will act to protect the exercise of that authority. Fulfillment of
48 Herbert Wechsler was the most famous exponent of this argument in the modem era. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL
LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 49 (1961). Larry Kramer updated the argument. See Larry Kramer, Putting
the PoliticsBack into the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
49 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:
A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).

50 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
51 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
52 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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that function alone would count as a separation of powers jurisprudence.
More speculatively, I suggest that the Court's instinct to protect its own interests may make it more willing to seriously entertain other separation of
powers claims.
If the Court perceives the exercise of judicial power to be threatened or
the judiciary compromised, the Court will act to protect itself. There are
many cases historically that provide evidence for that proposition, and there
are a striking number of cases in the Rehnquist Court that provide evidence
for it as well. The most straightforward is Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,"
where the Court held that Congress's extension of the statute-of-limitations
for a class of securities fraud claims constituted an invasion of the judicial
power because it required the re-opening of final judgments. 4 Sometimes
threats to the judiciary do not come from statutes. In Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 5" the Court held that a federal court can
appoint, subject to some limitations, a private prosecutor in order to prosecute a criminal contempt. Such authority, the Court reasoned, prevented
court dependency on the cooperation of the executive for the investigation
and prosecution of criminal contempts 6
Protection of the interests of the judiciary also pops up in all sorts of
not-so-on-point situations. The Court's reading of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in City of Boerne v. Flores bristles with indignation
over Congress's perceived attempt to challenge what the Court views to be
its superiority in the interpretation of the Constitution. 7 As a matter of

53 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
54 Id. The statute at issue in Plaut was enacted in response to Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), in which the Supreme Court established a statute of limitations for certain securities fraud suits; the suits had to be filed within one year after the discovery of the
facts constituting the basis for the claim and within three years after the violation. Id. at 364. As a result
of Lampf some suits that had been timely filed under the pre-Lampfregime had to be dismissed on the
authority of Lampf Congress reversed the Lampfholding for cases that had been filed prior to Lampf
and were, under pre-Lampfrules, timely. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 213-15. Under the statute, such suits could
be reinstated upon the filing of a motion. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (2000).
55 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
56 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988) is the follow-on case. Interestingly, in that case the Solicitor
General argued that the private prosecutor did not need his approval to seek certiorari. Id. at 698-99.
57 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997).
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of other
branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the
Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(I Cranch) 136, 177 (1803). When the political branches of Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in
the later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under
settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
Id.
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statutory interpretation, the Court held that the Federal Election Commission cannot seek certiorari in the Supreme Court without the Solicitor General's advance permission. 8 The Court held the same with respect to the
private prosecutor that it authorized District Courts to appoint in Young; in
that case, the holding went against the views of the Solicitor General himself. 9 These rulings are easily explicable; they serve the interest of the
Court by making sure it hears a single, familiar, and credible voice. Finally,
one last example comes from the Court's invalidation of statutory restrictions on the types of claims that Legal Services Corporation-funded lawyers
can bring. There, the Court reasoned that the restrictions were invalid in
part because they might limit the arguments that lawyers could make to a
court.' If one is looking for judicial attention to the interests of the courts,
one finds it in all sorts of places.
To understand some Rehnquist Court cases from this "court protection" perspective is a little more complicated. The Court's Article III stand6 for instance--can be
ing cases, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
understood to be about the protection of the judiciary's interests. In Lujan,
the Court is declining to hear a category of cases, which might be considered contrary to its interest in maximizing its power. But that is a naive interpretation.62 One must notice that the Court is deciding not to hear cases
that Congress, through broad citizen suit provisions, would like federal
courts to hear. One explanation for the standing cases is that the Court will
not hear cases that undermine what the Court views to be its appropriate
role. That is about protecting the judiciary even if, narrowly understood, it
is about not hearing a particular case.
Sustaining the U.S. Sentencing Commission is likewise hard to understand from a "protection of the judiciary" perspective. The claims against
that Commission were that Congress delegated legislative power inappropriately (a claim the Court easily dismissed) and, more particularly, that
Congress could not assign this particular task to an entity in the judicial
branch because it was not the exercise of a judicial power and the assignment threatened the independence of the judiciary. How could sustaining
such an arrangement protect both general judicial interests and the specific
exercise of the judicial power?
One can plausibly understand Mistretta as protecting judicial interests
by focusing on the internal hierarchy of the courts. A more objective senSee Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon, The Missing Pieces of the Debate over FederalProperty
Rights Legislation, 27 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 1, 76 (1999) ("No one can read Boerne without sensing the
Court's indignation at Congress' attempt in the RFRA to overrule Smith.").
58 FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994).
59 ProvidenceJournalCo., 485 U.S. 693 at 698-99.
60 Legal Serv. Co. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545-46 (2001).
61 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
62 Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004).
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tencing system is something that district court judges might resist, but not
necessarily something that appellate courts would resist. Objectivity in sentencing makes review of sentencing decisions easier. If one thinks of appellate courts as managers, the Sentencing Commission is a manager's dream.
All the better that it is housed in the judiciary and run in part by judges. As
for the Supreme Court's evaluation of the structure and location of the
Commission, the Court was concerned about the potential for the Commission to threaten the independence or the integrity of the judicial branch. It
was simply not persuaded that the Commission presented such a threat.
Whether an outside observer can understand the standing cases, Mistretta or Morrison, as consistent with the protection of judicial power or of
the judiciary as an institution is distinct from whether the judiciary perceives itself to be protecting itself. It is not easy to construct a positive theory of what counts as a threat to the judiciary and what does not. To take
some of the puzzling cases of the Rehnquist Court, the Court viewed the
statute at issue in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.63 to invade the judicial
power while the statute at issue in Miller v. French' did not. Nor did the
Court view the courts' role in the appointment of the Independent Counsel,
or the structure and location of the Sentencing Commission, to be a threat.
These conclusions are puzzling to many. But it matters little whether we
would endorse the Court's implicit vision of what qualifies as an invasion
of the judicial power or a threat to the independence of the judiciary. That
question is distinct from the more basic point here: When the Court perceives such a threat, it will rebuff it.
It matters for separation of powers law that the Court will reliably protect what it perceives to be its interests. In the first place, as long as the
Court is willing to police the boundary between judicial power and legislative or executive power and ask whether some assignment threatens the independence or integrity of the judicial branch of government, then, voild,
that is a separation of powers jurisprudence. If the Court will always reliably protect itself, in other words, there will never be a Garcia in certain
parts of separation of powers law.
Such court protection may have broader implications as well. When
the Court is policing the boundaries of judicial power and protecting the integrity of the judicial branch, it is also more likely to be in the separation of
powers business generally speaking. That is, it will be more willing to consider, and even protect, what it considers to be the interests of the other institutions of the federal government. This claim seems plausible, though it
cannot be proven. If the Court is protecting its own authority (Plaut is an
example) and carefully inspecting arrangements to make sure its integrity
and independence are not undermined (Morrison, Mistretta), then it would
be a little odd for the Court to explicitly state or implicitly suggest that the
63 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
64 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
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boundaries of the powers of other branches and the integrity of those
branches are beyond judicial ken. If this is right, the Court will hear the
claim that the line-item veto diminishes the authority of Congress; it will
hear and take seriously the claim that the Independent Counsel threatens to
undermine the executive by weakening the President's control over the exercise of executive power.
By comparison, there is no equivalent judicial interest in federalism
doctrines. At one time, perhaps there was. If the authority of the federal
courts were linked to the authority of the federal government more generally, then federal courts interested in protecting their own stature and authority would have an interest in expansive interpretations of federal
legislative or executive power.65 But that connection seems to have been attenuated today. The Court's conclusion in United States v. Lopez, for instance, that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds Congress's commerce
power66 does mean that there will not be federal question cases arising under that statute in federal courts. But this enforcement of the commerce
power does not seem to imply any limitation on the important prerogatives
of federal courts, such as the scope of judicial review, or the deference the
Court owes to state and federal actors.
B. The Eminent Justiciabilityof CertainSeparation of Powers Questions
1. Appointment and Removal Arrangements.-Separationof powers
doctrine has long been populated with a large share of cases that evaluate
how officials exercising governmental power are appointed or removed.
The Court has evaluated statutes that prevent the President from firing an
officer based on policy difference (Humphrey's Executor, Morrison), that
condition the President's removal on the Senate's consent (Myers), that involve Congress or the judiciary in the appointment or removal of the officer
(Morrison, Mistretta, Buckley v. Valeo, 7 Bowsher v. Synar6"), and that appoint a judge or a Member of Congress to exercise governmental authority
(Mistretta, Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for
Abatement ofAircraft Noise, Inc.69). Over the years, there have been many
65 See Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?,93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145,

149-50 (1998) (noting that federal courts may have "an abstract bias in favor of expanding the power of
the government with which they are affiliated" as well as "a concrete incentive to expand national government power and thereby augment their own jurisdiction vis-A-vis state courts" because an expansion
of federal legislative power might result in the expansion of federal judicial power); G. Edward White,
Recovering Coterminous Power Theory, 14 NOVA L. REV. 155, 168-69 (1989) (discussing the argument
made by the anti-Federalist commentator "Brutus" that the federal judiciary will expand the power of
the national government and its own jurisdiction by broadly interpreting the powers set forth in Articles
I and III).
66 514 U.S. 549, 561-68 (1995).
67 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
68 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
69 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
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such arrangements and the Supreme Court has been willing to evaluate their
constitutionality.
Is this obsession with appointment and removal evidence of lawyers'
capacity for paying attention to the trees and not the forest? As a result of
the toothless nondelegation doctrine, the Court does not police what many
government officials are authorized to do, but is for some reason intensely
interested in the mechanics of their appointment and removal. As I argue
below, this criticism is off the mark; these cases should instead be understood as evaluating part of the forest. But the point for present purposes is
that the existence of such arrangements and the Court's willingness to develop a body of doctrine that evaluates them helps explain why important
parts of separation of powers doctrine have not gone through periods, as
federalism doctrines have, of explicit or implicit nonjusticiability.
A striking number of the Supreme Court's separation of powers cases
have always been about the appointment or removal of various officers. It
surprises many to find out that Humphrey's Executor, a pillar of the law
making independent agencies constitutional, turns on whether the appointment arrangements-and, specifically, the restrictions on the President's authority to remove such officers-for such officers are constitutional. Under
Humphrey's Executor, Congress can insulate officers who perform quasijudicial and quasi-legislative functions from the President by providing
them a form of tenure.7 ° While less clear, Congress can also apparently
limit the President's appointment power by specifying bipartisanship (half
from each party) on multi-member commissions 7 or requiring the President
to choose from a limited list of appointees (Mistretta). But more direct
Congressional control over the officer, through actual appointment (Buckley), removal (Bowsher), or consent to the removal by the President
(Myers), it is clear, does not comport with the Constitution.72
This pattern of appointment and removal cases continued in the
Rehnquist Court. The crucial first holding in Morrison is that the independent counsel is an "inferior" officer for purposes of the Appointments
Clause, meaning that his appointment does not require the advice and consent of the Senate.73 Several other Rehnquist Court cases, including Frey-

70 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
71 FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994) (dismissing a challenge to bipartisanship requirements for want ofjurisdiction).
72 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143 (holding that appointment by House and Senate to FEC not constitutional nor is requirement that both houses approve all appointments); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736 (finding
it unconstitutional for Congress to retain power to remove Comptroller General, who performs executive
function under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that
requiring the Senate to approve removal of postmaster first class is unconstitutional).
73 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-73 (1988).
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tag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,74 Weiss v. United States,75 and

Edmond v. United States,76 raised questions about the line between a principal and inferior officer. Mistretta involved a creative appointment arrangement of another sort. The statute called for the appointment of three
federal judges as Commissioners of the Sentencing Commission."

Like-

wise too with Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., where Congress created a Board of
Review that included Congressmen and had veto power over the operations
of Reagan National and Dulles Airports.78

Leave aside for now why the rules about appointment and removal are
what they are. What is most significant is that the Court has been willing
(at least in the twentieth century) to evaluate appointment and removal arrangements, identifying constitutionally proper and improper ones. Compare this steady judicial activity with Garcia and Wickard/Darby's
announcements that the Court will not be in the business of identifying and
enforcing limitations in those areas. What explains the steady judicial activity?
The character of the Appointments Clause as a legal rule must help explain the Court's involvement.79 In contrast to many sources of law in federalism doctrine (and some in separation of powers doctrine), the
Appointments Clause sets forth a rule that invites judicial enforcement.
74 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (holding that a special trial judge appointed by the chief judge of the Tax
is an "inferior officer" and that the Tax Court is a "Court of Law" for purposes of the AppointClause).
510 U.S. 163 (1994).
520 U.S. 651 (1997) (stating that judge of Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals is an inferior
officer for Appointments Clause purposes).
77 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397-408 (1989).
78 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
79 A generalized version of this claim would be that the character of constitutional doctrine is explained by the character of the constitutional text that is being interpreted. More particularly, the argument would be that the more specific the constitutional rule, the less likely there is to be judicial
creativity and, with that, evolving constitutional doctrines. While most would take the example in the
text-President be thirty-five years of age-as a noncontroversial example that generally supports the
broader claim, the broad claim cannot be correct. There are some obvious counter-examples that disprove it. The Eleventh Amendment, which sets forth a classic rule but has been interpreted as if it sets
forth a standard about protection of state sovereignty, is one counter example. Many constitutional theorists have written on this question. For a characteristically thoughtful discussion of the claim about the
relationship between constitutional text and constitutional interpretation by judges, see Frederick
Schauer, ConstitutionalInvocations, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1295 (1997).
The claim I am making is much narrower. My claim is that the existence of a rule like the Appointments Clause helps explain the effective justiciability of the appointments questions. It is not that the
appointments rule is likely to be enforced in some particular way-say, consistently with its "literal"
terms. If its literal terms are violated, I suspect it would be literally enforced. (Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), is a good example.) But the bottom line claim here is not about the result that will be
reached in appointments cases; it is that the likely judicial response to the Appointments Clause will be
to enforce it in some way.

Court
ments
75
76
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The clause sets forth multiple classifications: principal officers who must
be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate; inferior officers
who may be appointed by the President alone, by a court of law, or by a
head of department (depending on the dictates of Congress); and perhaps
there is an implicit distinction between officers (either principal or inferior)
and employees. In terms of clarity, the clause is not akin to the requirement
that the President be thirty-five years old and a resident of the United States
for fourteen years." Nor is it as clear as its cousin, the Incompatibility
Clause.8" Even so, the Appointments Clause is a different kind of legal rule
than the Tenth Amendment or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
seems designed for courts to answer questions about it. The provision is
ambiguous enough to generate cases-the difference between a superior officer and an inferior officer, the difference between an officer and an employee, what counts as a head of department or court of law-but not so
open-ended as to permit any interpretation at all.
As any survey of the Court's nonjusticiability cases makes clear, it
takes more than the existence of a constitutional rule of some specificity to
explain justiciability. 2 There are provisions of the Constitution that supply
rules arguably similar in character to the Appointments Clause but are
nonetheless nonjusticiable. 3 For instance, a plurality of the Supreme Court
held nonjusticiable a challenge to President Carter's notice that he would
rescind a treaty that had been approved by two-thirds of the Senate." Some
of the arguments over the President's action were strikingly similar to the
dispute over the Tenure in Office Act. 5 The challengers claimed that the
Senate's advice and consent to the treaty implied the power to advise and

80 U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 1, cl. 5.

81 Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
82 The literature on this topic is so large that even the standard survey footnote cannot do it justice.
For a recent discussion and evaluation of the political question doctrine, see Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme than Court: The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002).
83 For example, the Court held nonjusticiable Judge Walter Nixon's challenge to the procedures
used by the Senate in his impeachment trial. The Senate relied on a committee, which Judge Nixon argued violated the requirement of Article I, section 3 that the "Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments." See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). There are also the several lower
court cases that have held nonjusticiable challenges to military actions taken without a congressional
declaration of war. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1973).
84 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The Court did not have merits briefing and argument.
Instead, it granted certiorari, vacated the judgment below, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the
complaint. Then-Justice Rehnquist wrote for a plurality to explain that the question was a political one
and therefore nonjusticiable. Id. at 1002.
85 And some of them were not. The fact that the treaty contained an explicit provision for termination by either party on one year's notice was crucial to the lower court's disposition in the case on the
merits. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir.),judgment vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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consent when the President rescinded the treaty.86 But the Court determined
that the dispute was a political question and therefore nonjusticiable. I
know of no general theory of nonjusticiability and developing one is far beyond the scope of this paper. What can be said is that the warning signs of
nonjusticiability-evaluation of the President's actions in the foreign affairs
area or scrutinizing Congress's internal processes-are absent in disputes
over the appointment and removal of officials. The more complete explanation for the continued adjudication of appointment and removal cases, then,
is the existence of a certain kind of legal rule (like the Appointments
Clause) and the absence the usual warning signs of a credible nonjusticiability argument.
One needs more than a rule that judges will enforce, however, to generate cases. One needs appointments arrangements that push at the boundaries of the rule. Congress has more than satisfied this requirement
historically and continues to do so. To be sure, the legality of Congress's
arrangements does not always turn solely on the Appointments Clause.
Congress has also rested such arrangements on the necessary and proper
power. And resistance to such arrangements has been rooted in claims
about infringement of executive power or more general concerns about
separation of powers. That said, many challenged arrangements over the
years, and in the Rehnquist Court as well, have required evaluation of the
Appointments Clause.
The Tenure in Office Act-which, in effect, required the Senate's consent before an officer could be removed from office-is the granddaddy of
these "creative" arrangements. It was approved, in part, on a theory rooted
in the Appointments Clause. That argument was that the method of removal followed the method of appointment and thus if the Senate provided
advice and consent for appointment it was also permitted to condition removal on its advice and consent. Many other arrangements straightforwardly test the internal workings of the Appointments Clause or its
applicability. The Independent Counsel Act is only constitutional if the
counsel is an inferior officer for purposes of the Appointments Clause. In
Freytag, a special trial judge appointed by the Chief Judge of the tax court
must be an inferior officer and the Chief Judge must be either a Court of
Law or a head of department for the arrangement to comport with the Appointments Clause. 7 In Buckley, Congress had attempted to appoint gov86 The argument is outlined in the D.C. Circuit's opinion. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 703 ("[The
argument] is that, since the President clearly cannot enter into a treaty without the consent of the Senate,
the inference is inescapable that he must in all circumstances seek the same senatorial consent to terminate that treaty."). Interestingly, the court goes on to note that this argument would mean that the Senate
must approve the removal of an officer that was appointed with advice and consent of the Senate, a position, the court points out, that was rejected in Humphrey's Executor. Id.
87 Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); see also Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163
(1994) (classifying military officers serving as military judges as inferior officers who are properly appointed based on their commission from the President); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997)
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ernment officials in ways that were inconsistent with the Appointments
Clause on many grounds;88 the Court determined that, given the functions
the Federal Election Commissioners exercised, they were officers of the
United States and therefore had to be appointed consistently with the
clause.89
Why does Congress establish these arrangements? Because rules that
structure the appointment and removal of an officer help shape the incentives of that officer. There is probably not a one-to-one relationship here;
government officials have many other pressures and demands on them that
might on any given occasion swamp the incentive created through appointment and removal rules. But creative appointment and removal arrangements must have some effect otherwise Congress would not keep adopting
them. Congress's interest is to arrange it so that the official will care about
Congress's views (for example, the Tenure in Office Act, Bowsher, or
Buckley) or has insulation from the President (for example, the independent
counsel, independent agencies generally, or the U.S. Sentencing Commission). Congress, in other words, adopts these arrangements for reasons that
do implicate separation of powers concerns. These are efforts to assert
Congressional influence over the officer or to insulate the officer from an
institutional competitor, the President.
In its narrowest form, the argument here is that the Court has been
ready to evaluate arrangements that explicitly test the reach of the Appointments Clause and that such cases matter because they implicate separation of powers concerns. I have also offered an explanation for why that
is so, one rooted in the character of the legal rule embodied in the Appointments Clause. But, even if my explanation for the pattern of cases is not
persuasive, it is the existence of the pattern that is important.

(determining that judge of Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals is an inferior officer and thus appointment by Secretary of Transportation is permissible).
88 424 U.S. at 113; see also id. at 118-41. There were six voting members. Two were appointed by
the President pro tempore of the Senate; two were appointed by the Speaker of the House; and two were
appointed by the President. All six of the voting members had to be confirmed by both houses of Congress.
89 Id. Some cases about the structure of an office do not involve the Appointments Clause. The
Court could evaluate the structure and appointment of the Sentencing Commission without much consideration of the Appointments Clause. And, while the clause speaks to the appointment of an officer, it
does not explicitly speak to the officer's removal. Although tenure-in-office restrictions on removal
were, as noted in the text, rooted in a negative implication of the Appointments Clause, other cases were
not defended on that theory. Where Congress kept removal power, as in Bowsher v. Synar, the Court's
evaluation did have to involve the Appointments Clause. 478 U.S. 714, 765-766 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). And the several cases involving what I have termed "indirect" restrictions on removalillustrated by Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) and Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 692-93 (1988)-were justified under the necessary and proper power. One could conceivably understand them as a "lesser included power" to a tenure-in-office power which was itself
rooted in part on the Senate's role in advice and consent. But they have not generally been defended on
that ground.
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As with the earlier argument about the protection of judicial prerogatives, if the Court did nothing but evaluate claims under the Appointments
Clause, that would constitute a separation of powers doctrine. Put the two
together-protection of the judicial power and the integrity of the judiciary,
and evaluation of appointment or removal arrangements that involve the
Appointments Clause-and there is a large body of separation of powers
law.
But the argument has a broader form as well. Given the Appointments
Clause cases that the Court will evaluate, the Court will also be inclined to
evaluate a broader set of appointment and removal arrangements, including
those that do not directly involve the clause. Assume that courts will generally consider claims brought to them that directly involve the Appointments Clause. First, such claims will often be bound up with other claims.
The defense of the Senate consent to removal in Myers was rooted in part in
the Appointments Clause and in part in the necessary and proper power.
The claims against the Act were that removal is an executive power and that
Senate consent to removal interferes with the exercise of executive power.
If the Court rejects one claim (advice and consent to removal is not implied
by advice and consent to appointment) it may at the same time be embracing another (advice and consent to removal interferes with the exercise of
executive power).
More than that, the holding in one Appointments Clause case takes on
a life of its own, doing work in other cases where the Appointments Clause
is not involved. Myers and Humphrey's Executor illustrate the point. In
Myers the Appointments Clause was at issue, but the Court rejected the argument in favor of the executive power argument. Within a decade, the
Court in Humphrey's Executor evaluated Congress's limitation on the
President's power to remove at-will an officer of the Federal Trade Commission. Humphrey's did not involve the Appointments Clause. Congress's limitation was defended as an exercise of necessary and proper
power. The statute was attacked on the ground that it interfered with the
executive power, an argument that was based heavily on Myers's holding
that the removal restriction at issue there interfered with executive power.
In that context, it seems almost inconceivable that the Court would hold the
dispute nonjusticiable. One can make a similar point about Morrison.
Evaluation of the independent counsel required the Court to interpret the
Appointments Clause, but there were other questions in the case-the validity of an interbranch appointment, the President's removal ability-that did
not involve the Clause but that would have been awkward for the Court to
avoid.
If the existence of a specific rule such as the Appointments Clause (as
well as the absence of the usual signals for nonjusticiability) helps explain
the regular appearance of cases that adjudicate appointment and removal arrangements, then the provisions of the constitution that touch on federalism
(for the most part) provide a contrast. The Tenth Amendment and Section 5
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of the Fourteenth Amendment provide the sharpest contrast. The meaning
of those provisions is created only after judges take it upon themselves to
interpret them by whatever method. The Commerce Clause is closer to a
rule, but it is still a far cry from the Appointments Clause. Indeed, of the
provisions associated with federalism, the Commerce Clause seems closest
on the generality/specificity dimension to the allocation of legislative power
to the Congress. The fact that the nondelegation principle is essentially
nonjusticiable and that the interpretation of the commerce power meant, for
at least some decades, that Congress could reach nearly any activity, is supportive of, not resistant to, the claims made here. Both the nondelegation
doctrine and the commerce power rest on constitutional provisions that are
open-ended enough (when compared to other legal rules of interest here) to
vest a great deal of discretion in the interpreter, which leaves space for
varying interpretations, including effective nonjusticiability. In contrast to
the Vesting Clauses or the commerce power, a rule like the Appointments
Clause is much less likely to generate a Garcia or a Wickard/Darby--arule
of explicit or implicit nonjusticiability.
2. The Existence of Comparatively Many Rules.-This point about
the rule-like nature of the Appointments Clause can be made more globally.
When compared to the provisions of the constitution that touch on federalism doctrine, the separation of powers provisions of the constitution are
comprised of a large number of rules. Separation of powers commentators
tend to focus on the Vesting Clauses, which are, at their outer edges anyway, allocations of authority that can be difficult to distinguish from one
9
another and hence difficult for judges to enforce in a straightforward way. "
Even so, the Vesting Clauses tell us more about what the rules are than the
Tenth Amendment or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But looking beyond the Vesting Clauses, the first three articles of the
constitution are literally riddled with "appointments clause-like" rules about
how the institutions of the national government will be designed and
staffed. Because governmental actors do not often take actions that violate
the literal terms of the Constitution, these provisions do not generate a lot of
cases. But their mere existence means, I think, that the Court is unlikely to
announce that the allocation of authority between the institutions of the national government will be left to politics.
Of the rule-like provisions of the Constitution, the ones that have generated some cases are the rules about bicameralism and presentment. Both
the legislative veto and the line-item veto were invalidated in opinions animated by the conviction that the political branches had attempted to make
an end run around the constitutionally-mandated procedures by which legislation is to be made. To the Court, the legislative veto permitted the enactment of legislation by a subset of Congress without bicameralism and
90 Magill, supra note 17, at 608-26.
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presentment.9 To the majority in the line-item veto case, there was a similar problem.92 If Congress could not constitutionally give the President an
actual line-item veto-defined as the ability to single out certain provisions
of a legislative package and refuse to affix his signature to those individual
provisions, while making the rest law-then Congress could not in effect do
that same thing by providing for a time lapse and calling the veto cancellation. Neither judicial opinion is entirely satisfactory. It is contestable to
say that the rejection of Chadha's deportation was itself a legislative act;
and it is contestable to say that the President's cancellation authority was
the equivalent of a repeal. But that misses an important feature of the two
decisions: The existence, and arguable applicability, of the specific requirements that could be mechanically enforced was important to the disposition of those cases.
To emphasize once again, the point here is quite narrow: Given the
presence of a fair number of constitutional rules about how institutions of
the national government are to work, rules that are specific enough that
their application can be relatively straightforward, it is unlikely that we
would see a Court opinion that explicitly or in effect treated questions about
the allocation of authority among the branches of government as questions
to be decided by politics.
The two explanations offered so far are in the service of the rather
modest claim that, in some areas of separation of powers law, the Supreme
Court will consistently adjudicate controversies-protecting the exercise of
judicial power and evaluating alleged violations of certain types of constitutional rules. In these areas, the Court is unlikely to ever retreat in the way
that it has with respect to important aspects of federalism doctrine. Though
modest, this claim may be important in explaining the disjunction between
the Rehnquist Court's movement in federalism doctrine and the lack of
movement in parts of separation of powers doctrine.
But the explanations offered so far do not explain the content of that
doctrine. Yes, the Court will be involved in adjudicating Appointments
Clause cases, but why has it settled on particular rules? The next set of arguments focus on that question.
To do so, one must first draw conclusions about the substantive content
of separation of powers doctrine. I will focus my attention on the Court's
acceptance as a constitutional matter of the administrative state. This substantive conclusion is reflected in many different doctrinal areas. In important respects, the Court has resisted claims that the Constitution establishes
a unitary executive. While Congress is not permitted direct involvement in
the appointment or removal of executive officials, it is apparently permitted
to limit the President's appointment powers in general ways and is defi91 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
92 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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nitely permitted to insulate certain officers from removal at will by the
President. Of more significance is that Congress can delegate significant
policymaking authority to expert bodies, mostly in the executive but also in
the judiciary, and the Court will not police those delegations to determine
whether they are so loosey-goosey as to constitute a give-away of legislative authority. Despite many arguments in favor of revitalization of the
nondelegation doctrine, and many opportunities, the Court will notemphatically will not-revitalize that doctrine. This Part asks why the substantive content of these parts of separation of powers law have not changed
in a period where the Court is willing to revisit some old commitments.
C. External Influences on Federalismand Separationof Powers Doctrine
Many have written on the external changes-economic, political,
demographic, sociological, intellectual-that have made the late twentieth
century a period where devolution to the states as a matter of policy and of
law is possible. Keith Whittington has provided one of the most comprehensive accounts.93 He first traces the forces that pushed toward a centralized, federal state in the earlier part of the twentieth century-the rise of an
expertise model of governing, of the positive state committed to economic
regulation and redistribution, and of commitment to regulating public morality.94 These centralizing forces reached their height in the 1960s, but
were then overtaken by factors that both raised doubt about the efficacy and
wisdom of centralized action and rehabilitated the states. In tracing that
changing environment on federalism questions, Whittington first argues that
many factors combined to make liberalism recede as the dominant vision,
and with liberalism went the governing ideology that "underwrote the modem state. '95 So too did economic forces-the rise of globalism, the structure of post-industrial economic entities-combine to diminish the efficacy
of any government's control over the economy. 96 As the federal government's stature as a moral force diminished and the states "gradually recov93 Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing StructuralFoundationsof
Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483 (1998) [hereinafter Whittington, Dismantling]; Keith E.
Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J.

477, 496-506 (2001) (explaining the shift in the Rehnquist's Court's attitude toward federalism as a response to changing "economic and social conditions," increasing Presidential and intellectual support
for federalism, and decreasing public trust in the federal government) [hereinafter Whittington, Federalism Offensive]; see also Howard Gillman, Reconnecting the Modern Supreme Court to the Historical
Evolution of American Capitalism, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS 235,241-46 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999) (ex-

plaining the New Deal shift in the Court's federalism preferences as a result of changes in the national
economy due to industrialization and suggesting that the reemergence of federalism associated with the
Rehnquist Court may also be due to major economic changes, such as globalization and decentralization).
94 Whittington, Dismantling, supra note 93, at 490-503.

9I Id. at 510.
96 Id. at 511-16.
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ered public confidence,"97 the federal government no longer acted as keeper
of the public morality. Whittington does not argue that the factors he identifies made a devolutionary trend in policy or law inevitable. But they do
make it possible in a way that he argues would not have been possible, say,
in the 1940s, 1950s, or even the 1960s.

Most would agree that separation of powers doctrines can be influenced by trends such as the ones Whittington recounts as facilitating centralization and then making decentralization possible. It is now a fairly
conventional claim that views, including judicial views, of Presidential
power tend to expand during wartime. 98 Events of the type Whittington and
others identify must have played a role in creating the view that administrative agencies operating under broad delegations from the Congress were
constitutionally acceptable.99 Many of the forces Whittington identifies as
pushing in the direction of a centralized state suggested that the state should
wield power through a particular form, that is, the expert bureaucracy."' 0 If
such forces could play a role in constitutionally blessing the administrative
agency-a position operationalized in law through a toothless nondelegation doctrine--could not external events create conditions that would make
that governmental structure less appealing and hence less constitutionally
acceptable?
Yes, of course they could, at least theoretically. But to understand why
that has not occurred, it is important first to clarify what such a factor would
have to suggest in order to influence the constitutional rules. Trends capable of influencing views on delegation would have to do more than cast
97 Id. at 516. Christopher Schroeder supplements the account by pointing to the ways in which distrust of the federal government has grown dramatically in recent years. Christopher H. Schroeder,
Causes of the Recent Turn in ConstitutionalInterpretation,51 DUKE L.J. 307, 334-51 (2001).
98 Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements,
86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 681-83, 708-22, 748-66 (1998) (arguing that the judiciary's acceptance of the
argument of executive necessity in foreign affairs and national security cases during the Cold War, and
the resulting entrenchment of deference to the executive in these areas, has led to a "permanent expansion of executive power"); Jill Elaine Hasday, Civil War as Paradigm: Reestablishing the Rule of Law
at the End of the Cold War, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 130-32, 137-40 (1996) (comparing the expansive understandings of executive power during the Civil War and the Cold War); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1398-1412, 1418-21 (1989)
(discussing the growth of executive power during the twentieth century as a result of the Cold War and
U.S. involvement in international affairs (such as the drug war, Central America's instability in the
1980s, and the Iran-Contra affair)); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second World War, 1941-1946,37 CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 4-21 (1987) (discussing Supreme Court cases dealing with executive and legislative powers during World War II).
99 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balanceof Power in the Administrative State,
89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 479-87 (1989) (tracing the development of the nondelegation doctrine in the
twentieth century and its application to administrative agencies); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1039, 1056-59, 1104-06 (1997) (discussing the
public interest understanding of administrative agencies and its influence on the nondelegation doctrine).
100 Whittington, Dismantling, supra note 93, at 490-93; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE NEW DEAL 94-129 (2000).

99:47 (2004)

The Revolution that Wasn't

doubt on regulation in general. That is because the alternative to administrative agency regulation under vague mandates is surely not no regulation.
If a court invalidated a regulatory scheme on nondelegation doctrine
grounds, the likely result would be that Congress would re-adopt the legislation and provide for private enforcement or it would cure the lack of intelligible principle, re-enact the legislation, and re-delegate to the same
administrative agency. So factors that might have the capacity to influence
non-delegation rules would have to cast doubt, not on regualtion generally,
but on actions taken by administrative agencies.
The constitutional doctrine facilitating delegations to such entities has
stubbornly refused to move. Does this mean that the courts are enchanted
by administrative agencies?1 ' To the contrary. If the New Deal period
started with enormous enthusiasm about the capacity for expert administration, that attitude was quickly replaced by skepticism about the possibility
of the talented and public-spirited regulator. The agency official rather
quickly came to be viewed as incompetent or, worse, in the business of delivering rents to the parties he was supposed to regulate. Judicial doctrines,
mostly in the field of administrative law, evolved rather dramatically to take
account of this new vision." 2
Why didn't such skepticism lead to a revision in the nondelegation
doctrine? Let me offer three admittedly speculative suggestions. First, the
rise in disenchantment with administration came at the wrong time given
the overall jurisprudential commitments of the Supreme Court. The con101 Eric Claeys has thoughtfully argued that the Supreme Court's case law can be explained by
commitment to a progressive theory of apolitical administration. When apolitical administration is advanced, the Court upholds the arrangement; when apolitical administration is undermined, the Court invalidates the arrangement. See Eric R. Claeys, Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers
on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts (forthcoming 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=480691 (last visited Sept. 16, 2004). As I suggest in the text, I think the argument
misses the serious skepticism of agency decisionmaking that is now reflected in administrative law doctrines.
102 Merrill, supra note 99, at 1059-68, 1075-1112 (discussing the shift in the dominant understanding of administrative agencies from public trust to capture theory and the resulting consequences for legal doctrines concerning agencies); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and
Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1142, 1149-55 (2001) (explaining federal court decisions of the 1960s and '70s that heightened review of agency actions and required agencies to engage in rulemaking, in part, as a response to criticism that agencies had become "arbitrary,
inefficient, and inevitability captured by the interests they were supposed to regulate") [hereinafter
Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise]; Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative
Law and the ChangingDefinition of Pluralism,53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1417-42 (2000) (describing the
decline of "interest group pluralism" and subsequent efforts by courts to make the administrative process
more participatory through the doctrines of judicial review, administrative process, and standing) [hereinafter Schiller, Enlargingthe Administrative Polity]; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670, 1712-60 (1975) (identifying the change in attitude
towards the traditional administrative state and describing the resulting development of legal doctrines
by federal judges to insure fair representation of parties affected by the actions of administrative agencies).
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cern that agencies might be captured manifested itself in judicial doctrine
by the mid to late 1960s. But that was a period where the post New Deal
settlement-about the scope of federal power, about deference to social and
economic legislation-was not open for re-negotiation. A revitalized nondelegation doctrine, remember, would mean sweeping invalidation of significant parts of the apparatus of the federal government. For example, the
EPA, the FCC, the FDA, the FTC, the OSHA, and the SEC all administer
some vague mandates; it is conceivable that adherence to nondelegation
doctrine would necessitate invalidation of portions of each of those agencies' missions. But at the point when skepticism of agency behavior seeped
into the courts, such sweeping judicial invalidation of parts of the federal
government was not in the realm of the possible. More than this, as just
noted, it was not (and still is not) clear what would be achieved by revitalizing the nondelegation doctrine and invalidating major parts of the administrative state. Judicial invalidation of parts of these agencies' missions may
not have seemed much better. That alternative was not, as discussed earlier,
the end of regulation of those fields. In the face of an invalidation, Congress would probably re-enact statutes and have them privately enforced or
re-delegate to the administrative agency with more specific instructions.
Finally, the nondelegation doctrine was not the only space in which
courts could express their concerns about agency power. There were many
outlets for judicial skepticism because courts had sub-constitutional tools
available to tame that incompetent or captured agency. These were tools
that courts used with vigor. Through the everyday mechanisms of administrative law, courts transformed what agencies were required to do in order
to survive judicial review of their actions."l 3 Agency actions had to be
transparent, participatory, and reasonably justified for the court."° Once
tamed, the administrative agency does not seem a candidate for reform even
when it does become possible to reconsider old commitments.
D. The Normative/PoliticalValence of Federalismand Separationof
Powers
Aside from those who describe the changing conditions that make
movement toward devolution possible, many commentators stake out more
normative positions on the Court's federalism decisions. They argue that
the Court's federalism revival is explained by some factor and then they ei103 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcom-

ing 2004).
104 See Stewart, supra note 102, at 1717-22 (discussing the requirements of administrative process
and adequate consideration of interests, the rights of participation by individuals in agency proceedings,
and the expansion of standing); Merrill, supra note 99, at 1074-1103 (discussing the expansion of the
"availability" and "scope" of judicial review of administrative actions); Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity,supra note 102, at 1417-42. Such sub-constitutional activity continues apace. See Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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ther decry or celebrate that development. Several commentators, for instance, have characterized the Rehnquist Court federalism revival as politiPolitical conservatives are fans of federalism, so goes
cally conservative.'
the argument, because state governments are less likely to enact certain
types of regulation and wealth redistribution regimes. Given interjurisdictional competition, for example, redistribution of wealth is systematically
less likely to occur at the state level. Others explain that the court has
rightly become more persuaded of the traditional virtues of a federalist system-experimentation and inter-state competition yielding superior approaches (races to the top), diversity (carrying the possibility of satisfying
more preferences), or the intrinsic value of decentralized government decisionmaking.' °6
These arguments paint too broadly. It is hard to take much away from
the checkerboard of the Court's federalism "revolution." Piece together the
Court's decisions on the Commerce Clause, Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the anti-commandeering rule rooted in the Tenth Amendment,
and state immunity from damage actions rooted in the Eleventh Amendment. These movements in the direction of the states are a strange mishmash that hardly add up to a full-scale shift of government authority to the
states.'017 Compared to the results one might hope to achieve, or fear would
result, from a comprehensive devolution of federal authority to state governments, the Court's decisions seem a thin reed indeed. Nonetheless, I
shall take as a given that-at the margins, as the economists like to sayfederalism decisions can be understood, as well as defended or critiqued,
along such dimensions as consistency with a politically conservative prefer105 See, e.g., Herman Schwartz, The States' Rights Assault on Federal Authority, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 155-67 (Herman Schwarz ed., 2002) (asserting

that the Rehnquist Court's federalism jurisprudence is a "states' rights resurgence" and should be understood as a masked "assault on those shortchanged by birth and by fortune").
106 Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 24, 27-28 (2001) (recounting the traditional arguments in favor of federalism (satisfaction of preferences, healthy competition between jurisdictions, increased policy experimentation, and greater accountability)). In Calabresi's view, federalism "merely perfects the Madisonian
constitutional system, which pits differently assembled majorities in different constituencies against
each other in the hope that the true popular will thus emerge and prevail." Id. at 35; see also John 0.
McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville 's America: The Rehnquist Court'sJurisprudenceof Social Discovery,
90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 489, 511 (2002) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court is engaged in a revival of federalism that can be described as part of its jurisprudence of "decentralization and private ordering of social
norms").
107 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 468 (2002) (describing the Rehnquist Court's federalism cases as a
"mixed picture"). "If the Supreme Court is implementing a federalism revolution, it is thus distinctively
a lawyers' revolution. Though the rhetoric is sometimes audacious, few landmarks have toppled. Much
of the significance, if not the devil himself, inhabits the details." Id. at 494; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 47-54 (1998) (explaining
the impotence of the Eleventh Amendment as "a structural constraint on the powers of the federal government").
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ence for state instead of federal action, or for the traditional values of federalism-experimentation, diversity, and localized decisionmaking.
What is striking about all these perspectives on federalism is that, despite their differences, they are committed to the notion that limitations on
federal power, and comparative enhancement of state power, have predictable consequences. They then bemoan or celebrate those consequences.
But the shared assumption is that it really matters whether states decide
something or the federal government decides something. The specific
views underlying the assumption are that states will be more politically
conservative; they will experiment by pursuing diverse responses to social
problems, which can tell us something about the best response or at least
permit people to match with the state regime that most suits their preferences; or states satisfy a deep need for decisionmaking that is close to the
people.
The shared assumption seems quite plausible. Shifting authority away
from federal actors and to state actors is to send authority to a systematically different set of decisionmakers. State political systems are genuinely
different political systems than the national political system. Consider first
the formal differences one notices in a survey of state governmental structures. Many governors have line-item veto authority;" °8 many state judiciaries are elected;0 9 many states have traditions of referenda." 0 And the less
formal differences are no less real. There are systematic ideological and
cultural differences that map on to states and regions of the country. Levels
of state regulation and state redistribution vary even in the current regime,
where there is strong pressure toward national uniformity.
Those who write about separation of powers believe that it really matters whether, for instance, Congress or the executive branch decides some
question. And on many important levels, it does. The executive and the
legislature are structured and staffed differently. Not only are these institutions structured differently, they have different jobs to do, different ways of
doing those jobs, and different internal norms. And from a democratic theory perspective, the choice between Congress and an administrative agency
is the choice between decisionmakers with electoral connections and those
without direct electoral legitimacy.
But those who think about separation of powers can exaggerate these
differences and the comparison to federalism well makes the point. To take
up the primary delegation question, if one compares the choice between
108 Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto Be Transferred to the
President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 166-67 (1986) (describing the different types of veto power that states
have authorized their governors to exercise).
109 Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elected Judiciariesand the Rule of Law, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 689, 725 (1995).
110 Nathaniel A. Persily, The PeculiarGeography of Direct Democracy: Why
the Initiative,Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 11 (1997); Harry N.
Scheiber, Forward, The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism,28 RUTGERs L.J. 787 (1997).

99:47 (2004)

The Revolution that Wasn't

Congress and the executive on the one hand to the choice between the federal government and state governments on the other, the consequences of
the intra-federal choice seem puny because the differences by comparison
look lilliputian. Compare two hypothetical cases: In one, the Supreme
Court holds that the Occupational Safety and Health Act is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it lacks an intelligible principle by which the agency can implement the Act. Congress will have to rewrite the Act with more specific standards if the regime is to stand. In the
other case, the Court holds that there is no enumerated power that permits
the federal government to have a federal regime of occupational safety and
health. No Congressional re-drafting will solve the problem; occupational
safety and health regimes, if they are to exist at all, will exist at the state
level only. Is there any doubt that the latter would be revolutionary while
the former would not? The federal political system is first and foremost a
federal system. When compared to the federal/state choice, the incentives
of decisionmakers in the federal system-and especially the two democratic
institutions-are more similar than different; the constituencies that care
about what government does are active in, have access to, and influence in
the whole range of federal institutions.
This matters because it means it is difficult to predict the outcome of a
t t
shift of authority from one institution to the other. " If the President had a
line-item veto, would the world look a lot different? If Congress specified
regulatory trade-offs instead of administrative agencies specifying regulatory trade-offs, would the world look a lot different? The answers to these
questions are far from clear. Those choices would channel decisionmaking
to different decisionmakers (to the President from Congress; to the Congress from the agency) with different ways of doing business. But no matter where the decision is lodged, the decisionmaker without the authority
will continue to exist, will express its views, and will remain a repeat player
in a federal system where there are thousands of occasions for inter-branch
negotiation and compromise. More than that, the constituencies that care
about the choice that is being made will energetically press their views to
the decisionmaker, no matter where he sits. It is for these reasons that the
allocation of authority between Congress and the executive, for instance,
does not have the sort of systematic valence as does the choice between the
federal government and state governments. And, without such predictable
consequences to either celebrate or worry about, it will be much harder for
external forces to influence in major ways doctrines like the nondelegation
doctrine.

111 The argument here is more comprehensively developed elsewhere. See Magill, supra note 17,
at 632-49.
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IV. LESSONS OF THE COMPARISON
This comparison between federalism and separation of powers has
some broader lessons. One lesson is that we should be cautious of some of
the global explanations that have been offered for the Rehnquist Court's decisions. A turn toward historically informed constitutional interpretation
cannot explain what has happened in separation of powers law. Nor can an
explanation that emphasizes the Court's confidence about its exercise of judicial review explain the Court's resistance to revising some parts of separation of powers doctrine.
The most important lesson, though, is that federalism and separation of
powers are not siblings. They might not even be cousins. True, they are
both about channeling decisionmaking authority to particular institutions
and they are not about placing substantive limits on government decisionmaking generally. But they are fundamentally different as a matter of positive law and political economy. For those reasons, the internal and external
factors that generate the doctrine should be expected to produce different
patterns. In other words, the main lesson here is that the federalism and
separation of powers are apples and oranges. They will not ripen and fall
off the tree together and we should not expect them to.

